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Abstract
We ask whether linking savings accounts to contests can promote saving. We do this by offering
contest-linked accounts to individuals in rural Uganda where poverty is a serious problem. Our design
builds off of results in experimental economics documenting excessive competitiveness in contests, with
the goal of harnessing this behavior for the good. We find that, properly designed, we encourage savings
beyond both pre-treatment levels and the control group. We explore reasonable heterogeneous treatment
effects and document long lasting impacts on wealth.
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Introduction

In developing countries, the poor face numerous uncertainties and must develop costly coping strategies to
deal with them (Morduch, 1995). Governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, and academic
researchers have devised numerous interventions to help the poor. A central component to these interventions is a focus on financial markets. Financial markets provide the opportunity to self-insure through
savings, smooth consumption via borrowing, and obtain the capital necessary for entrepreneurship. Since
the popularization by Mohammed Yunus and his Grameen Bank (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Yunus, 1999),
microfinance activities, particularly microcredit, has been a useful tool to cope with the uncertainties of
economic life in poor communities.
What has received considerably less attention are interventions designed to promote savings amongst the
poor. As emphasized by Besley, Coate, and Loury (1998), this is an important omission. While income
constrained, the poor do have the ability to save. Demand for durable goods and a desire to smooth adverse
income shocks are high. As has been well documented, credit instruments come at extremely high interest
rates (Morduch, 2000). Thus, savings, even at negative real interest rates, should be of considerable value.
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Early microfinance initiatives did not offer savings products, as many institutions targeted entrepreneurs,
offering them microcredit. As institutions begin to incorporate more formal savings products into their
services, we see a shift in the focus of microfinance from entrepreneurship to risk-coping mechanisms for
households (Churchill, 2002).
The practical question becomes how to design financial institutions, mechanisms, and products to promote
savings by the poor. Financial sustainability (Louis, Sere, and Baesens, 2013) is a problem faced by many
microfinance institutions. Lack of subsidies (D’Espallier, Hudon, and Szafarz, 2013) and poor governance
(Servin, Lensink, and van den Berg, 2012) make it difficult for these institutions to operate efficiently
within communities. The addition of savings products provides institutions with the means to address
sustainability, but questions arise regarding how to structure savings products that meet the demands of
households. Time preferences, such as time inconsistency and impatience (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 2006), are
hindrances. Financial literacy (Lusardi and Tufano, 2009) can be expected to be minimal. Further, salience
in appreciating the future benefits to the savings, relative to the more-salient, immediate opportunity costs
of forgone consumption, can be expected to be a barrier.
We design a novel mechanism which we believe can promote savings. We call it “Save to Win” accounts.
Our intuition comes from the extensive behavioral and experimental economics literature on contests. Building off Tullock’s (1980) seminal theoretical contribution, contests ask participants to make non-refundable
expenditures to obtain a prize. The prize is assigned probabilistically to one contestant, and the probability
of winning is driven by a participant’s relative share of total expenditures made. Extensive literatures have
applied this framework to rent-seeking, R&D expenditures, election spending, and employee effort just to
name a few. Central to our intuition, laboratory experiments have documented consistently an over-spending
where subjects compete excessively, relative to Nash equilibrium predictions, which are themselves excessive
relative to social optimums (Dechenaux, Sheremeta, and Kovenock, 2015). Numerous explanations have
been investigated including, prominently, a joy of winning preference (Sheremeta, 2010) and impulsiveness
(Sheremeta, 2018).
Typically, these contests are viewed through the lens of destructive competition. The excessive competition is socially wasteful. For example, consider rent seeking. If a government agency is to award a
procurement contract to one supplier, for example, firms in that market are incentivized to promote their
bids, which can include lobbying expenditures, perks to the decision makers, and even corrupt activities such
as bribes (Tullock, 1967). Our innovation is to ask whether the excessive competitiveness contests generate
can be harnessed for the good. Rather, can linking contests to savings activities produce the positive spillover
effect of building up wealth in a poverty stricken community not currently utilizing savings opportunities?
To answer this question, we partner with a small, nonprofit organization operating in rural, southern
Uganda. The organization had previously made microloans in the community as part of its development
strategy. It had just expanded by constructing a microfinance bank that now also accepts deposits. Seeing
little uptake, we created contest-linked savings accounts and made them available in two six-month phases.
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Participation eligibility for our control and treatment mechanisms was done randomly to establish our
interventions’ causal effects.
In our Save to Win accounts, subjects are assigned to a treatment. In it, we provide the necessary opening
account balance (2500 Ugandan Schilling) and provide the funds to cover the interest on the deposits (2%
per month). In the control group, subjects are free to make deposits into the account. The high interest
rate compensates them for the illiquidity, as the money could not be withdrawn until the end of the sixmonth trial phase. In our treatments, a fixed proportion of a subject’s deposit each month is entered into
a contest. The remaining is deposited into their savings account. Subjects are put into five person groups
and a prize winner is determined probabalistically, as in Tullock Contests. The prize is deposited into the
winner’s account. Treatments differ in the proportion of the deposit that goes towards the contest and by
the determination of the size of the prize. Those in the control are given the high interest rate and beginning
account balance as well, but do not have the opportunity to engage in the contests.
In the first phase, two treatments were implemented where 40% and 20% of the deposit, respectively,
went into the contest (leaving 60% and 80%, respectively, for the savings account). For both, the prize was
set equal to the total expenditure of the five group members. Hence, our Save to Win intervention was zero
sum. In the second phase, the treatment maintained the 20/80 distribution, but introduced a guaranteed
minimum prize.
By comparing depositing behavior of those in the treatments to those in the control, we can assess the
causal impact of contests on savings. By comparing subject savings choices to their own choices prior to
the intervention and to those not in the study, we can evaluate the overall impact of our intervention on
savings and wealth. Finally, by tracking the account balances in the year after the intervention, when their
accounts become liquid and the high monthly interest rate is gone, we can appreciate the longer term impact
on wealth.
We document a number of important findings. First, during our intervention those in our study deposit
substantially more than they did prior to our intervention and by others in the community not currently
participating in the study. Average account balances in the month prior to our intervention were 3757
Ugandan Schillings (hereafter, UGX) per subject. By the end of our intervention it is 21,027 UGX. Savings
grew by a factor of 5.6. Thus, we promoted savings.
Second, the Save to Win treatments had higher deposits than the control group, with the effect greatest
in our treatment with the lower proportion going into the contest and the guaranteed minimum prize. Here,
average monthly deposits are almost 2000 UGX greater than the control group, and the probability of making
any deposit in a month is almost 8 percentage points higher. Therefore, properly constructed, introducing
contests into savings account, can promote savings.
Third, we administer decision-making assessments and collect background information on our subjects.
We document important heterogeneous treatment effects. For one, we show that our Save to Win intervention
is valued primarily by those who are recorded (in an incentivized, price-menu instrument) as not being risk
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averse. This is reasonable since the intervention introduces uncertainty. We also show that the increased
deposits are concentrated in those who self report as being a patient person. Hence, we find evidence that
both risk and time preferences matter for the intervention’s success. Additionally, surveying our subjects’
past experiences with financial markets, we find evidence that those who have previously received microloans
do not utilize the Save to Win accounts as much. This effect is sensitive to the inclusion of other background
characteristics though. Finally, we document a relationship between self-reported participation in gambling
on sports and behavior in our mechanism. Gamblers “gamble” more when their savings is linked to contests.
In fact, the effect is enhanced when there is not a minimum guarantee on the prize. Thus, we have suggestive
evidence that participation in our Save to Win program correlates with other, related personal finance
activities.
Fourth, we track the account balances of our subjects after the intervention. We document, contrary to
our initial worries, that subjects do not liquidate after their account balances roll over into standard accounts
without withdrawal restrictions or interest payments. While 88% of our subjects did not have an account
prior to the intervention, only two closed their accounts within six months of the end of our trial (1.4%). For
most subjects, balances remain relatively stable and for some treatment cohorts, average balances actually
grow! Even at twelve months after the Save to Win accounts ended, the average savings account balance
is 28,076 UGX for our subjects (regardless of treatment) when it was 4020 UGX prior.1 This is almost a
doubling of the average account balance since the end of our intervention.
We are obviously concerned about where the funds came from and what consumption opportunities were
given up to make the deposits we observe. Tracking use of informal savings and borrowing mechanisms
(such as family loans) and correctly identifying forgone consumption is notoriously difficult. Even more
problematic is identifying the normative implications of our intervention. To that end, we survey subjects
twelve months (six months) after our intervention ended for participants in the first (second) phase. We
find that the majority of our subjects report that they would have saved their money at home absent
our intervention. Thus, we mitigate risk. Approximately one-third of our subjects say that they gave up
consumption. Regarding anticipated future behavior, only 10% expect to close their account in the future,
while 60% plan to further increase their balance.
In Section 2 we briefly survey the literature on microsavings efforts as part of poverty mitigation, outlining
how our mechanism compares to others attempted. It also samples the behavioral literature on contests. In
Section 3 we provide a straightforward theoretical model, which generates testable hypotheses. We describe
our intervention’s setting in Section 4. In Section 5, the methods and protocols employed are outlined. We
analyze the data in Section 6 establishing both the average and heterogeneous treatment effects. Section 7
presents the post-intervention quantitative and qualitative results. In Section 8 we provide our concluding
discussion.
1 As will be described in the methods section, these last two figures are based on the subjects who participated in the first
phase of the invention, so that they have a full twelve months after the invention.
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2

Prior Research on Microsavings and Contests

Prior research on microfinance is vast and focuses primarily on microcredit. Mostly due to the influence of
Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank, microcredit was quickly adopted by many governments and nonprofit organizations as part of large-scale economic development strategies that target poverty alleviation
among low-income households (Morduch, 1999). Results from these studies identify two channels through
which microfinance functions, as entrepreneurship or consumption smoothing.
Many of the first microcredit initiatives targeted small scale entrepreneurs as their clientele. Evaluations
of profits and incomes (Banerjee et al., 2015), employment (Augsburg et al., 2015), investment (Crépon et
al., 2015), and return on capital (de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff, 2008) offer compelling evidence with
regards to microfinance and local economic growth and institutional efficiency. Studies that assess the effects
on social welfare characterize microfinance as being used as a consumption smoothing mechanism. Studies
of food consumption (Pitt and Khandkar, 1998; Attanasio et al., 2015), health outcomes (Hamad, Fernald,
and Karlan, 2011), and subjective well-being (Karlan and Zinman, 2011) provide evidence for important
effects of microfinance on low-income households.
Given the identified benefits of microfinance to households, a large portion of the academic literature
focuses on the various structures of microcredit and evaluate its delivery and use by individuals and groups.
The institutions studied aim to address possible shortcomings of traditional credit-lending mechanism and
design financial products to meet the environment and demand of local communities. Attempts to experiment
with repayment frequency (Field and Pande, 2008) and grace periods (Field et al., 2013) provides information
to institutions that help determine the most effective menu of financial products, with regards to both
financial sustainability and customer retention (Tedeschi, 2006). Moral hazard and adverse selection make
it difficult for microfinance institutions to operate effectively in rural communities. Group lending has
traditionally been a way for these institutions to mitigate the monitoring costs associated with credit. Other
studies have looked at dynamics of group-lending like the regularity of group meetings (Feigenberg, Field,
and Pande, 2013; Feigenberg et al., 2014), group size (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner, 2006), and incumbent
lending (McIntosh, De Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2005).
Ultimately, the economic impact is mixed and the general consensus is that the positive effects of microcredit is limited and temporary (Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman, 2015).2 This has led researchers to evaluate
alternative financial market interventions.
Some have considered conditional cash transfers (Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler, 2011) and microinsurance
(Banerjee, Dufalo, and Horbeck, 2014). A few, like us, have explored ways to promote savings among those
in poverty. Savings products were not offered by many early microfinance initiatives, as many assumed
low-income households were too poor to save (Morduch, 2000). Yet, empirical evidence on savings finds
the opposite to be the case. Positive effects to savings mobilization like increased account balances and
2 The reader is encouraged to consult the special issue in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics which provides
a special issue bringing together numerous papers attempting to measure microfinance’s impact.
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savings activity (Asharf, Karlan, and Yin, 2008; Dupas, Keat, and Robinson, 2018), as well as investments
in household public goods (Schaner, 2016), suggests significant welfare effects for low-income households.
Increased empowerment of women (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Duflo, 2012), lower education expenditures
(Karlan and Linden, 2014), and reduced risky sexual behavior (Witte, et al., 2015) represent more important
benefits of savings to communities, at large.
Like the research on microcredit, microfinance institutions work to design different products to encourage
savings among low-income households. Studies explore the effects of no-fee savings accounts (Dupas and
Robinson, 2013), fixed-deposit savings, and bank-insured savings groups (El-Gamle et al., 2014) on households’ willingness to save. Karlan et al. (2016) investigates the effectiveness of reminders to save. Each
study provides insight into the demand for savings, and we add to this literature by introducing contests as
a mechanism to promote savings activity.
The design of our savings mechanism most closely resembles a prize-linked savings account. Kearney
et al. (2010) provides a survey of the literature on prize-linked savings products and their prevalence in
banking institutions around the world. A large portion of these products target medium to low-income
households, given the high demand for gambling and lotteries among these groups. These accounts pool
the interest accrued on the deposits of account holders and uses it as the prize in a monthly lottery. The
probability of winning the lottery becomes a function of how frequently you make deposits, thus encouraging
savings among account holders. Experimental evidence shows that this deposit behavior can be driven by the
expected value of winning or a joy of winning behavior, where individuals gain utility from participating in
competitions, even more so than the expected value of a prize. Contests represent an environment where the
joy from winning is particularly prevalent. Sheremeta (2013) provides an extensive survey of the experimental
economics literature on the overbidding, which raises concerns about the the utility gained from the joy of
winning in contests. Wasteful spending is destructive to communities in any context, but especially so for
medium and low-income households. Banking institutions that understand this overbidding behavior can
offer a savings product to reduce its consequences and harness potentially destructive behavior for a positive
spillover for an individual.
We contribute to the literature on field experiments and savings mobilization in rural communities by
designing and implementing a contest-linked savings product that promotes savings behavior in southern
Uganda. Our experiment is the first to combine a contest and savings mechanism in the real world, where
deposits directly affect your probability of winning a prize. The effects of prize-linked savings accounts have
been studied in laboratory settings, where studies explore preferences for prize-linked products (Dizon and
Lybbert, 2019) and how this type of account affects wealth generation (Filiz-Ozbay et al., 2015). Two field
studies have explored prize-linked savings accounts, but are not designed to harness the overcompetitiveness
of contests. Linardi and Tanaka (2013) attempt to induce savings in a U.S. homeless shelter. A $100 prize
was given to the individual with the greatest savings each month. Thus, their intervention is akin to an
all-pay auction. While effective in the first month, they explore why it is unable to incentivize savings in
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the following months of their study. Cole et al. (2016) explore data from a South African bank that offered
prize-linked savings accounts. Like a typical contest, savers were given tickets into a lottery. The number
of tickets received corresponded to the savings account balance. Importantly, the tickets were not awarded
based on additional deposits, but the size of the balance each month. Further, unlike contests studied in
the laboratory, there is no chance of incurring a loss if the participant does not win the prize. Thus, each of
these efforts have designs that constrain the competitive environment. Gertler et al. (2018) partner with a
Mexican bank and, like the scenario studied by Cole et al. (2016), issue lottery tickets for saving. They issue
tickets based on deposits, rather than accumulated savings, and show that they are able to induce individuals
to open accounts. Again, there is not ’skin in the game’ by the participants in that downside losses are not
possible. Our contest environment allows participants to choose their monthly ‘effort’ level to win the prize,
and conforms closely with the behavioral literature on contests which lead to excessive competition. Finding
important treatment effects in our field experiment, our results are also the first to indicate positive, longterm effects of contest-linked savings accounts. Our results align with experimental literature regarding
competitive behavior in contests and provide a novel contribution to the field of development economics and
a broad literature on the positive effects of savings mobilization in growing, rural communities.

3

Theory

To create our hypothesis regarding the intervention’s effects, we build a straightforward theoretical environment. We consider an individual making the decision between current consumption and future consumption
in a two-period model. Savings allows for both consumption smoothing and participation in a contest, which
is enjoyable. Parameterizing a joy of winning, risk preference, and the contest treatment, we derive testable
predictions.

3.1

Model

An individual plans consumption over two time periods, labeled 1 and 2. Let ct and wt denote the amount
consumed and earned in period t. Income is exogenous. Along with choosing how much to consume, the
individual has the opportunity to save, with the amount denoted by s. We consider an environment where
the individual can save but not borrow; i.e., s ≥ 0. This, we believe, accurately represents the typical
opportunities for an individual in a developing part of the world. Informal savings mechanisms are available,
such as at-home savings, but poverty is correlated with inaccessible financial markets.
Let the instantaneous utility from consumption be denoted u(ct ; θ) and let time be discounted at the
rate δ ∈ (0, 1). The parameter θ captures the subject’s risk preference. Larger values of θ correspond to a
more risk averse individual.3 Assume the payoff function is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing,
and strictly concave in ct to ensure the full exhaustion of resources.
3 We have in mind θ as the coefficient of relative risk aversion that would arise in the CRRA utility function u(c; θ) =
We choose to not limit ourselves to a specific functional form though.
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1
c1−θ .
1−θ

Also, research in behavioral economics has provided evidence that a “joy of winning” exists. Subjects
tend to enjoy winning, above and beyond the additional expected consumption that can arise with the
prize. We use the term joy of winning loosely so as to represent any motivation that leads to the excessive
competitiveness observed in the laboratory. To keep the analysis general, we let J(s; θ, τ ) denote the expected
joy experienced from the contest. This benefit term is driven by the amount saved as that can be expected to
increase the size of the prize and the probability the subject wins it. Hence, assume J(s; θ, τ ) is continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in s.
Thus, the expected, discounted utility function to be maximized is
U (c1 , c2 , s) = u(c1 ; θ) + δu(c2 ; θ) + J(s; θ).

(1)

The contest we implement organizes individuals into cohorts (in the field, we set the cohort size to 5).
Each subject is assigned a treatment and the cohort s/he is grouped into includes individuals of the same
treatment (where both the treatment and cohort are random assignments). We parameterize the treatment
by τ ∈ [0, 1]. If the individual chooses to save s, then τ s is deposited into his/her savings account and
(1 − τ )s is entered into a contest. Following a traditional Tullock Contest framework (Tullock, 1975; 1980;
Dechenaux, Sheremeta, and Kovenock, 2015), the probability the individual wins the prize of size Π is
ρ=

(1−τ )s
(1−τ )Σsj

where Σsj is the total amount saved by all subjects in the contest. If the individual wins the

contest, the prize is deposited into his/her savings account and, therefore, is subject to interest accumulation.
Along with varying the treatments, we will differentiate the determination of the prize.
In the field, we consider three values of τ . In the “Low” treatment for every 500 UGX deposited, 300
UGX goes into the savings account and 200 UGX are entered into the contest. Thus, τL = 0.6. In the
“High” treatment less is entered into the contest and more is deposited into the savings account. In it, for
every 500 UGX deposited, 400 UGX are saved and 100 UGX are entered into the contest. Hence, τH = 0.8.
In the “Control” all money deposited goes into the savings account. Thus, τC = 1.
A budget constraint exists for each time period. The constraints on the individual’s utility maximization
problem are c1 + s ≤ w1 for t = 1 and c2 ≤ w2 + (1 + i)τ s + (1 + i)E(s; τ ) for t = 2 where E(s; τ ) is the
expected gain from the prize when s is saved and the treatment is τ .4 The term i is the interest rate earned
on the savings.5
Finally, we consider two mechanisms to determine the size of the prize. In the first, the prize received by
the contest winner is simply the sum of the expenditures made by the subjects in the cohort. This is done so
that the intervention is zero-sum fostering savings in the community without external subsidization. Hence,
Πz = (1 − τ )Σsj . In the second mechanism, we ensure a guaranteed minimum prize. That is, if the total
expenditures on the contest falls below a set threshold, denoted Πg , then the contest winner receives Πg . If
4 We are considering a very simple problem where the expected prize is used in the budget constraint. A fuller model would
allow second period consumption to be a function of the realization of the contest. Our goal here is to present the simplest
model possible to create testable hypotheses for our field experiment.
5 While it is natural to presume i is positive, it can be zero (as many bank accounts in the developing world do not provide
non-zero (nominal) interest rates) or even negative (with inflation causing negative real interest rates). We only require 1+i > 0.
In the field, we provide a 2% interest rate per month.

8

the total expenditures exceed this threshold, then Π = (1 − τ )Σsj (= Πz ), as before. Traditional contests in
the lab utilize a fixed prize that does not vary with expenditures. Thus, our guaranteed minimum attempts
to foster the over-competitiveness identified there.

3.2

Save to Win Mechanism

The Lagrangian to be maximized is
L = u(c1 ; θ) + δu(c2 ; θ) + J(s; θ, τ ) + λ1 (w1 –c1 –s) + λ2 (w2 + (1 + i)τ s + (1 + i)E(s; τ )–c2 ).

(2)

First, it follows immediately that the joy of winning component is necessary for our intervention’s success.
If J(s; θ, τ ) = 0 and Π = Πz (so that the second-period budget constraint is simply w2 + (1 + i)s ≥ c2 ), then
a standard utility maximization problem arises and our treatments do not have an effect on savings choices
made.
Hypothesis 0: If subjects derive utility only from consumption, then: [1] the Save to Win mechanism will
not change the likelihood that they will save a non-zero amount, [2] the amount saved (if a non-zero amount
is chosen) will not change if offered the Save to Win intervention, and [3] savings behavior will be the same
across the treatments.
Hence, a joy of winning is needed if our intervention is to change behavior.
Our intervention is designed to leverage individual’s willingness to “over-compete” in contests. To illustrate this, when a subject selects a non-zero level of saving it follows from complementary slackness that
∂L
∂s

= 0. Rather,


∂L
∂J
∂E
=
− λ1 + λ2 (1 + i)τ + (1 + i)
= 0.
∂s
∂s
∂s

(3)

Consequently, the optimal level of saving for the individual will be driven in large part by the marginal
benefit to the contest,

∂J
∂s .

∂2J
∂s∂τ

<0

Assumption 1:

We make the following assumption regarding the individual’s joy of winning:

The implication is that the marginal joy from saving is less if little is entered into the contest (higher values
of τ ). If most of the deposit goes into savings, rather than the contest, then the joy from anticipating victory
is small. The more our intervention allows entries into the contest, the more happiness is generated in our
subjects from competing.
Applying this assumption, it is straightforward to verify the following result.
Hypothesis 1: If subjects experience a joy to winning and Assumption 1 holds, then in the no-guarantee,
zero-sum treatment (Π = Πz ): [1] the Save to Win mechanism will increase the likelihood that they will save
a non-zero amount, [2] the amount saved (if a non-zero amount is chosen) will be greater if offered the Save
to Win intervention, and [3] savings will be greater in treatments where more is entered into the contest.
9

Hypothesis 1 is our main result and motivation for conducting the field experiment. Fixing the enjoyment
of contests and risk preferences, the Save to Win intervention is expected to increase the amount deposited,
relative to the environment where all of the deposit goes directly into a savings account.
This result, though, is driven by Assumption 1. Creating treatments where more of the deposit goes into
the contest leads to more savings if the marginal utility to competing grows. If this assumption does not
hold, then the Save to Win mechanism will not be effective.
With the zero-sum prize, the expected monetary gains are simply the amount put into the contest by the
individual, E(s; τ ) = (1 − τ )s. Thus, an individual expects to get his/her expenditures back. Consequently,
it is not obvious that a person’s nonmonetary enjoyment from the contest is really affected by the treatment
parameter here. Thus, in the zero-sum prize without the guarantee, Assumption 1 may not hold. As a
result, our intervention may not be effective.
With a fixed, guaranteed prize, on the other hand, the expected return depends on how much other
individuals put into the contest. In laboratory experiments, the over-competitiveness arises with fixed
prizes. Hence, we install the guaranteed minimum prize to ensure the property defined in the assumption
holds.
More precisely, we make the following additional assumption regarding the individual’s joy of winning:
Assumption 2:

∂2J
∂s∂τ |g

<

∂2J
∂s∂τ |z

<0

That is, the marginal effect of savings on the joy of winning is affected more by the treatment when in
the guaranteed prize contests as compared to the zero-sum, no-guarantee prize contests. The guaranteed
prize treatment (Π = Πg ) provides the possibility for the Save to Win mechanism to promote savings even
if Assumption 1 does not hold for the no-guarantee prize.
Hypothesis 2: If subjects experience a joy to winning and Assumption 2 holds, then [1] the likelihood of
saving a non-zero amount will be greater in the Save to Win mechanism with the guaranteed minimum prize
than when there is no guarantee and [2] the amount saved (if a non-zero amount is chosen) will be greater
with the guaranteed minimum prize than when there is no guarantee.
Hypothesis 2 further refines our predictions when we go to the experimentally-generated field data. While
our Save to win intervention is expected to improve the extensive margin and intensive margin of savings
(Hypothesis 1), we expect these effects to be larger when the guaranteed minimum prize is used (Hypothesis
2).

3.3

Risk and Time Preferences

Not every person can be expected to respond the same to the Save to Win intervention. The theoretical
model incorporates a discount factor to capture time preferences, and a risk aversion term to parameterize
risk preferences. Here, we explore how our intervention interacts with these important preference dimensions.
10

First, it is straightforward to verify that a more patient individual, who has a greater value of δ, is more
likely to save.
Hypothesis 3: A more patient individual [1] is more likely to save a non-zero amount and [2] saves more
(if a non-zero amount is chosen).
An individual with a greater value of δ places more weight on future consumption and is, consequently,
more interesting in savings. Our intervention is designed to facilitate savings and, thus, it is reasonable to
expect that this will be especially well received by patient individuals.
Regarding risk preferences, though, our intervention introduces uncertainty. A portion of the individual’s
deposit is entered into the contest. With a high probability, the individual will not win the contest. For
example, since we organize subjects into five person cohorts for the contests, in a symmetric Nash equilibrium
the chance of winning the prize is only 20%.
What is unclear is how the joy of winning component responds to this uncertainty. We proceed with
the assumption that the marginal benefit from competing declines the more risk averse an individual is.
Assumption 3 formalizes.
Assumption 3:

∂2J
∂s∂θ

< 0.

With this assumption, the more risk averse individuals are less willing to save with our Save to Win
intervention.
Hypothesis 4: If subjects experience a joy to winning and Assumption 3 holds, then a more risk averse
individual [1] is less likely to save a non-zero amount and [2] saves less (if a non-zero amount is chosen).
Hypothesis 4 suggests that our intervention can create a conflict. While our Save to Win mechanism is
designed to encourage savings by those who enjoy competition, it can be off-putting to those who dislike
uncertainty. Therefore, we would expect our intervention to be successful with those who are not too risk
averse.
Notice that the comparative statics predictions laid out in Hypotheses 1 through 4 are not conditioned
on the behavior of the others in the cohort. The amount saved is driven by others’ expenditures (through
affecting ρ and, hence, J and E). Thus, Hypotheses 1-4 apply to the Nash equilibrium of the game as well.

4

Setting

Embrace It Africa is a 501(c)3 nonprofit organization operating in the town of Bethlehem in the Rakai district.
The Rakai district is in southern Uganda bordering Tanzania. Embrace It Africa has been functioning in the
region since 2008 providing access to education for orphans and microfinance to entrepreneurs.6 In January
6 See

McCannon and Rodriguez (2019a) for an analysis of Embrace It Africa’s microfinance activities in the community and
McCannon and Rodriguez (2019b) for an evaluation of orphanhood there.
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2018 the organization opened a bank facility, named Mikwano7 , to provide savings opportunities to those in
the community.
We partnered with the organization to design a savings product, which we describe in the next section.
Our intervention occurred in two six-month phases. Phase 1 occurred between July and December 2018.
Phase 2 occurred between January and June 2019.
We utilized the networks established by the nonprofit organization to recruit. Embrace It Africa provides
funding for the school in town and has a long history of providing microloans. Community leaders and
region-wide advertising were utilized to let individuals in the community know that a savings product will
be made available at the beginning of each phase.
During the first week of July 2018, 103 adults showed up to participate in our intervention. These
individuals were randomly assigned into one of three cohorts, again described in the next section. All
members of the community were eligible to participate, including those who had previously opened savings
accounts at the bank and those who had not. During the first week of January 2019, 43 additional individuals
showed up to participated in our second phase. These 43 did not participated in Phase 1, and those who
participates in Phase 1 were not eligible for Phase 2. Those in Phase 2 were randomly selected to be in one
of two cohorts. The Phase 2 intervention ended in June 2019.
Mikwano started opening savings accounts and accepting deposits in January 2018. The accounts offered
were standard for the country. To open an account, an individual is required to have a 2500 UGX minimum
account balance.8 Deposits can be withdrawn at any time that the bank was open. No interest is paid on
the balances.
Over the first six months of the bank’s existence, few in the community utilized the opportunity. Those
who did open an account maintained only small balances. The upcoming section provides descriptive data
on these accounts. Embrace It Africa had been making microloans in the community for over a decade,
so it has a strong, positive image in the community and should not suffer from lack of institutional trust.
Therefore, we worked with Embrace It Africa to promote the new savings opportunity they provide to the
community.

5

Method

We first describe the Save to Win accounts provided. Then, we lay out the protocols used in the field.
Finally, the data collected is described.
7 The

word ’mikwano’ is the Lugandan word for friendship.
exchange rate is approximately 3500 UGX per 1 USD. From interviews with locals, a typical daily wage for a laborer
is 2500 to 4000 UGX per day. Further, Uganda has a minimum wage law requiring 6000 UGX per month. Thus, the opening
balance is a nontrivial amount.
8 The
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5.1

Save to Win

Subjects in the treatment can make any size deposit any time within the month. A proportion τ of the
deposit went into the individual’s savings account and 1 − τ goes into a contest. Subjects may make more
than one deposit during the month, or may choose not to make a deposit.
On the last business day of the month, subjects within a treatment who made a non-zero deposit during
the month were grouped randomly into five person cohorts. The amounts entered into the contest for the
five are pooled together. One person is selected at random and wins the pooled amount. The probability of
winning is equal to that person’s share of the total expenditures for the five-subject group for the month.
The winner’s prize is publicly announced and deposited into that subject’s account. Interest is then paid
on each account at the nominal rate of 2% per month. This procedure is redone each month for six months.
Thus, each subject has six observations − his/her monthly deposits for the six months of the intervention.
In Phase 1, subjects are randomly assigned to one of three protocols. One is the control who may not
enter the contest. For them, 100% of each month’s deposit goes into the savings account. In a second, which
we call Treatment 4-1, four of every five Ugandan Schillings deposited go into the savings account. Thus,
if a subject deposits 5000 UGX, then 4000 UGX go into savings and 1000 UGX are entered into a contest
(rather, τ = τH = 0.8). In the third, which we call Treatment 3-2, three of every five UGX deposited go to
savings. Thus, a person in this cohort who deposits 5000 UGX, for example, would have 3000 UGX added
to savings and 2000 UGX entered into a contest (rather, τ = τL = 0.6). Phase 2 subjects were randomly
assigned to one of two protocols. One is a replication of the control group from before. The other cohort
engages in Treatment 4-1 again.
The difference between Phase 1 and Phase 2 is the size of the prize gained by those in Treatment 4-1. In
Phase 1, as described, the prize is equal to the total expenditures of the five in the group. Rather, it is zero
sum (Π = Πz ). Our motivation is that this design requires the least amount of subsidization. We do cover
the interest payments, to reduce the burden of our intervention on the community’s bank, and provide the
opening account balances as a “show-up” fee for our experimental subjects. After that, no additional funds
are needed from the bank or the researchers to offer Save to Win accounts.
In Phase 2, we instituted a minimum prize guarantee. We ensured that if the total prize was less than
20,000 UGX, then we would make up the difference to give the winner 20,000 UGX. If total expenditures
exceeds this lower bound, then the prize is equal to the full pot.
The minimum prize was set to be near, but exceed, the upper bound of the prize sizes from Phase 1.
We did this to see if we can increase deposits from what we see in Phase 1. It was designed to further
promote savings. Also, our intention was to consider a design that more closely resembles Tullock Contests,
which typically involved pre-determined, fixed prizes. The five person group size was selected to promote
anonymity, given our modest sample sizes. The group size is held constant across all treatments. Finally,
we decided not to replicate Treatment 3-2 with a minimum prize guarantee in Phase 2. As will be shown in
the upcoming section, this treatment did not have an effect on savings relative to the control. Fearing that
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it may be dis-incentivizing savings by putting too much into the contest, we discontinued it for the second
phase.

5.2

Protocol

As described, our intervention was widely advertised throughout the community. On the opening day of
our intervention, we provided food for a community meal, which is an expected cultural practice. Adults
willing to participate came into Mikwano’s bank building and completed the paperwork necessary to open
the account.
During this process, subjects pulled a piece of colored paper out of a cup. Three colors were used in
equal proportions. The colors corresponded to the three cohorts. Thus, each subject was equally likely to
be assigned to the Control, Treatment 4-1, and Treatment 3-2.
A total of 103 individuals agreed to participate during the first week of July 2018. This makes up the
Phase 1 subject pool. There were 34 selected for Treatment 3-2, 43 for Treatment 4-1, and 26 for Control.
Included in the application paperwork was a survey collecting basic background information. Subject reported their gender, age, marital status, number of children, education obtained, occupation, and experience
with financial markets.
Deposits were taken continuously over the month. On the last business day of the month the contests
were scored. Subjects often attended the contest drawings, but this was not mandatory. The winner’s prize
was deposited into his/her account. The procedure for determining the winner was repeated each month for
six months. The groupings were randomly determined and anonymous.9 Each group consisted only of those
within the same treatment.
Individuals who did not open an account the first week of the study, were recruited to engage in Phase
2. This was introduced in January 2019, corresponding to the end of Phase 1. The same procedures
were utilized. With equal likelihood subjects were assigned to Treatment 4-1 and Control. As before, the
treatment stayed the same over the six month trial.
A total of 43 adults participated in Phase 2. Of them, 33 were assigned to Treatment 4-1 and 10 were
assigned to Control. Thus, we have a total of 146 subjects engaged in our intervention monthly over six
months spread out over two phases.
During the six months of the intervention, withdrawals from the Save to Win accounts were not allowed.
Subjects were free to have standard savings accounts as well. A few subjects had opened accounts before the
intervention. Subjects who had these standard accounts can deposit and withdraw from them freely. The
standard accounts did not pay interest. To compensate individuals for our intervention’s illiquidity, we paid
each subject a 2% monthly interest.10
9 It was anonymous except for the identities of the winners, who were publicly announced. Also, it was common for the
number of depositors in a treatment for a month to not be perfectly divisible by five. The remainders (randomly selected) were
paired with depositors in the next month (of the same treatment) to determine the prize winner.
10 Therefore, our (external) compensation to the participants consists of the community meals (before the start of Phase 1),
the 2500 UGX opening balance for each of the 146 subjects, the difference between the pot size and our 20,000 UGX guaranteed
minimum for those groups below the cutoff in Phase 2, and the 2% monthly interest on deposits made.
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At the end of the six month phase of our intervention, the account balances were rolled over into standard
savings accounts. Thus, they were liquid and earned no interest.

5.3

Data

First, while we use a randomization device to assign subjects to treatments, it is appropriate to check the
similarity of the partitions of the subject pool. Table 1 presents a balance table comparing the subsample
averages on the background characteristics measured.
Table 1: Balance Table
Control Treatment 4-1
Age
32.11
33.12
Number of years of education
7.60
7.30
Number of children
3.26
3.61
Are you married? (Yes = 1)
0.514
0.697 *
Are you single?
0.343
0.184 *
Are you divorced?
0.057
0.053
Are you widowed?
0.086
0.066
Do you grow crops?
0.829
0.933
Do you own livestock?
0.686
0.684
Do you hold an elected position?
0.114
0.408 ***
Is your house made of mud?
0.057
0.066
Is the floor of your house concrete/solid? 0.771
0.803
Does your house have electricity?
0.457
0.263 *

Treatment 3-2
28.53
7.18
2.44
0.529
0.412
∅
0.059
0.824
0.853
0.235
0.030
0.735
0.324

N

34

35

76

The individual-level data set is considered. A difference-in-means t-test (allowing for unequal variances) compares the
treatment’s mean to the control group’s mean; *** denotes 1% level of significance, while ** and * denote 5% and 10%,
respectively. Data from both phases pooled.

The asterisks in the table are the result of a difference-in-means t-test between that particular treatment
and the control group. For the most part, the samples are indistinguishable − age, family size, education,
and occupations look similar. Those in Treatment 4-1 are slightly more likely to be married and may have
less access to electricity. The one anomaly is that they are more likely to have an elected position in the
community. Overall, the subject pools are similar in these observables.
Regarding deposits made, participation varied. Only 18 had a savings account prior to the intervention
(12%). During the intervention, 98 made no additional deposits beyond what they contributed the first day
of the trial (68%). Thus, in the upcoming analysis, we will explore both the extensive and intensive margins
to saving. For those deposits after the initial month of each phase, the average monthly deposit made was
just less than 9000 UGX. In the next section, though, we evaluate differences in depositing behavior across
the treatments. By the end of our intervention, total wealth in the accounts is 16,260,359 UGX11 , where it
was only 544,700 UGX prior − an increase by a factor of 30!
11 This figure includes (compounded) interest earned and the opening account balance, along with the deposits made and
prizes won.
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Finally, consider the pot sizes won in the actual contests. The distribution of the pots is depicted in
Figure 1. For Treatment 4-1, Phase 1 (darker gray) is separated from Phase 2 (lighter gray). We separate
the prizes received in Treatment 4-1 since the phases differ in the use of the guaranteed minimum. The
distribution of prizes in Treatment 3-2 is provided in black.
Figure 1: Distribution of Contest ‘Pots’

Prop. of Pots
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0
0-5k
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Each column depicts the proportion of scored contests that have a pot size within each specified range. The black bars are
the distribution in Treatment 3-2. For Treatment 4-1, the dark gray depicts the distribution from Phase 1 and the light
gray provides it for Phase 2.

As one can see, the pots are concentrated in the 5000 UGX to 15,000 UGX range in both phases. Overall,
the average size of the pot is 11,339 for the five-subject groupings (combining both treatments and both
phases). Thus, the 20,000 UGX minimum guarantee represents a nontrivial increase in the expected prize’s
size. In fact, for those subjects in Phase 2, the minimum was a binding constraint for 85% of the cohorts.
The distribution of pots in Treatment 3-2 sits to the left of those in Treatment 4-1. For those in Treatment
4-1, the distribution shifts to the right for Phase 2 where the minimum prize guarantee was added. These
two observations will be explored further in the upcoming section.

6

Results

Our analysis of the results is done in three steps. First, we conduct an outlier test. Due to the small, rural
community as our targeted population, our sample sizes are modest. As a consequence, one can reasonably be
concerned that extreme behavior out of one subject can have meaningful distortions on the sample averages.
Second, we establish the treatment effects statistically. This provides our main result. In the final subsection,
we evaluate heterogeneous treatment effects to assess which subject characteristics correspond to the success
of the treatments.
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6.1

Outlier Test

As with any individual-level data set with a modest number of observations, one should be concerned about
an outlier observation affecting the estimated average treatment effect.
To illustrate, Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the average, per month deposit made by subjects in
each of the three treatments.
Figure 2: Distribution of Average Deposits Across Treatment

The data set is collapsed to the subject level calculating the average per month deposit for each subject. The plotted
cumulative distribution functions separate those subjects in Treatment 3-2 (labeled ‘T-32’), Treatment 4-1 (labeled ‘T-41’),
and the control.

As one can see, the cumulative distribution function of those in the control group experiences a substantially different right tail to the distribution. One subject deposited substantially more than any other
individual in the cohort. His/her deposits are almost 3.4 times as large as the second largest depositor in
the control. The savings behavior of this one subject sits far beyond the rest of the subjects in the pool.
Behavior is more consistent within the pool of treated subjects. For example, in Treatment 4-1, Guarantee
the person with the highest average deposit has a per month value only 19.7% higher than the second highest
depositor and is 24.3 times as great as the median individual, as compared to 133.7 times as great for the
outlier in the control cohort. Similarly, in the Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee sample, the person with the
highest average deposit is only 16.8% higher than the second highest depositor. The amount is 46.3 times
as great as the median.
The control subject pool has one outlier individual who engaged in substantially more savings than
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others in the experiment. The concern, then, is that the presence of this one individual with extreme
behavior can sufficiently distort the average treatment effects. Therefore, in the upcoming analysis, we
exclude this individual from the data set. Also, depictions of the sensitivity of our results to outliers are
presented in the appendix. There, the primary result (the estimated average treatment effect) is re-estimated
by systematically dropping each of the other subjects in the control. It illustrates that there is little change
in the estimated average treatment effect when any other subject is eliminated from consideration. Thus,
our results are not sensitive to the subjects selected in our control sample, except the single outlier shown
in Figure 2.
Second, both Phase 1 and Phase 2 included a control group. Behavior in the two cohorts is statistically
indistinguishable. The difference in the mean deposit for the control group across the two phases has t = 0.42
from a difference in means test (p > 0.67). Since the two distributions are statistically indistinguishable, we
will pool them into one sample for the upcoming analysis.

6.2

Treatment Effect

We now turn to the primary question − whether the Save to Win intervention promoted savings. We evaluate
it using two metrics. First, is the savings level observed (statistically) greater than zero? Since our subject
pool is made up of those who do not engage in savings (for the most part), any savings can be considered a
victory. Prior to the beginning of the two phases, only 11.6% of the subjects had a savings account at the
community bank. Our intervention consists of two parts − an enhanced monthly interest rate well above
market rates and a contest. Therefore, the second, higher hurdle to leap over is to establish that the Save
to Win accounts outperform the control group’s savings behavior. As stated, our control group gains from
the high interest rates, but does not have the contest.
Figure 3 first compares the cohort average per month deposit sizes. We chose to separate those who
engaged in Treatment 4-1 into those with the guarantee, labeled “T4-1+G”, and those who did not, labeled
“T4-1+NG”. We include average per month per subject deposits of those assigned to Treatment 3-2, labeled
“T3-2”, and the control.
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Figure 3: Treatment Effect: Deposit Size

Avg. Deposit per Subject-Month
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Comparing only the Control to the Treatment 4-1, Guarantee group (labeled “T4-1+G” in the figure), a two-tailed,
difference-in-means t-test (allowing for unequal variances) has t = 1.88 (p = 0.062). A Wilcoxon Ranksum test has z = 2.07
(p = 0.038).

As one can see, all cohorts experience savings behavior far exceeding zero levels. Thus, the intervention
leads to more formal savings. In addition, the average per month deposit into traditional savings accounts
prior to the intervention is less than 500 UGX. Each confidence interval lies above this amount. Hence,
deposits during our intervention are all substantially greater than what is observed using traditional savings
accounts. The difference is highly statistically significant. Thus, we achieved our first goal.
Result 1: The Save to Win intervention lead to more formal saving than traditional savings accounts.
Regarding the second hurdle, first note that the Treatment 3-2 has a substantially lower average deposit
than any other cohort including, importantly, the control group. Thus, it seems that too much of the amount
deposited went to the contest. Presumably, subjects were uninterested (for the most part) in participating.
Treatment 4-1, without the guarantee, sees greater depositing than Treatment 3-2 (which also does not
have the guarantee), but is statistically indistinguishable from the control group’s savings behavior.
The noticeable treatment effect arises when the guaranteed minimum prize is introduced. The average,
per month deposit is 79.4% greater than in the control. Using a Wilcoxon Ranksum test, the difference in
the distributions is statistically significant (z = 2.07; p = 0.038). Therefore, a treatment effect exists.
Another way to assess our intervention and the difference between the treatments is to consider the time
series of account balances. Figure 4 presents the average account balance for our subjects in each month
separating the individuals into the four cohorts. Hence, Phase 1 and Phase 2 are pooled together. Time
is re-centered around the beginning of the treatment. That is, rather than consider the calendar months,
we consider T ime = 0 as the first month of the intervention. Thus, the Save to Win contest occurred in
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T ime ∈ [0, 5]. We also report in Figure 4 data from account balances prior to the intervention. Since the
microfinance bank had been open for six months prior to our intervention for participants in Phase 1, we
include T ime ∈ [−6, −1] as well.
Figure 4: Account Balances Centered on the Treatment
Account Balance
50,000
Treatment
Period
40,000
Treatment 4-1, Guarantee

30,000

20,000
u

u Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee
u u
u
u e e e e Control
e

10,000
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e
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e e e e
Time
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Data is centered on the beginning of the treatment. Open circles denote the average account balance of those within the
Control group. Closed circles denote the average account balance of those within the Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee group.
The squares denote the average account balance of those within the Treatment 4-1, Guarantee group. The triangles denote
the average account balance of those within the Treatment 3-2 group. The y-axis measures the average (per subject)
account balance for those within each cohort each month.

As one can see, average account balances were quite modest prior to our intervention. Regardless of which
cohort a subject is assigned to, a substantial improvement in savings occurs. Our Treatment 4-1, where 80%
of one’s deposit goes into the savings account, especially with the prize guarantee, sees the largest response.
Figure 5 also considers the prevalence of making a deposit. Specifically, it considers the proportion of
subjects in a month who make at least one deposit, regardless of its size. In other words, it investigates
saving’s extensive margin.
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% Subject-Months with at Least One Deposit

Figure 5: Treatment Effect: Activity
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Comparing only the Control to the Treatment 4-1, Guarantee group (labeled “T4-1+G” in the figure), a two-tailed,
difference-in-means t-test (allowing for unequal variances) has t = 1.68 (p = 0.093). A Wilcoxon Ranksum test has z = 1.68
(p = 0.092).

Similar findings arise. Treatment 3-2 has relatively less savings activity. Treatment 4-1 without the
guarantee is, again, statistically indistinguishable from the control. Treatment 4-1 with the guarantee records
a noticeably higher proportion of the subjects who make a deposit in a given month than the control.
While Figures 3, 4, and 5 provide our main result, they do not account for differences in the background
characteristics and experiences of the individuals who make up each cohort. The balance table previously
presented shows some slight differences in the subject pools. Thus, it is appropriate to establish that the
cohort differences identified are not sensitive to controlling for differences in the subject pools. Table 2
presents the results.
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Table 2: Treatment Effect: Deposit Size
Model:

OLS
(2)
-1639.78 **
(816.94)

OLS
(3)
-930.81
(804.44)

Tobit
(4)
-5240.65
(2719.83)

Treatment 4-1, Guarantee

1916.52 **
(823.19)

1836.34 **
(838.71)

6299.18 ***
(2493.37)

Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee

76.99
(772.36)

786.25
(773.61)

3703.05
(2453.81)

Treatment 3-2

Treatment 4-1

OLS
(1)
-163.78 ***
(819.05)
875.74
(694.83)

Background Controls
Treatment Month Controls

No
No

No
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

R2
AIC

0.015
18180

0.021
18177

0.158
17673

0.062
5423

The dependent variable is the size of the subject’s total deposit for a month (in Ugandan Shillings); µ = 2488.79 UGX. A
constant is included in each specification, but not reported. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *** 1%; ** 5%;
* 10% level of significance. N = 870 for (1) and (2). For (3) and (4), it is N = 852. There is missing information from one
subject on Age, one subject on Crops, and one subject on Mud. In (4), there are 622 left-censored observations and 230
uncensored observations.

As suggested in Figure 3, Treatment 3-2 coincides with lower average monthly deposits. Treatment 4-1
has larger deposits than the control, but the difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero, column
(1). When this treatment is separated into those who had the guarantee and those who did not, the effect
is identified, column (2).
The average treatment effect is robust to the inclusion of subject specific controls and month fixed effects,
column (3). Also, we estimate a Tobit model recognizing the large number of zeroes that exist in the data.12
The treatment effect persists in this alternative estimation, column (4).
While Table 2 establishes the volume of savings, Table 3 uses an indicator variable equal to one if a deposit
of any size is made in a month by the subject as the dependent variable. This table tests the robustness of
the observations made in Figure 5.
12 Here,

72.0% of our subject-month observations are zero.
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Table 3: Treatment Effect: Activity
(2)
-0.0559
(0.0438)

(3)
-0.0460
(0.0290)

Treatment 4-1, Guarantee

0.0768 *
(0.0441)

0.0757 **
(0.0302)

Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee

0.0124
(0.0414)

0.0484 *
(0.0279)

Treatment 3-2

Treatment 4-1

(1)
-0.0559
(0.0438)
0.0404
(0.0371)

Background Controls
Treatment Month Controls

No
No

No
No

Yes
Yes

R2
AIC

0.008
1065

0.010
1064

0.626
239

The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the subject made at least one deposit; µ = 0.2747. A constant
is included in each specification, but not reported. Linear probability model estimated. Standard errors are presented in
parentheses; *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level of significance. N = 870 for (1) and (2). For (3) and (4), it is N = 852.

Again, the Treatment 4-1, especially with those within the cohort that were given the guarantee on the
prize’s size, respond by increasing the rate at which they participate in the savings program. Therefore, we
establish our second result.
Result 2: The Save to Win intervention with contests for a guaranteed prize lead to more formal savings
than the control group with only the high interest rate.
Thus, Hypothesis 2 receives strong empirical support.
Finally, while not the focus on the analysis, we also identify an effect of winning a contest on subsequent
deposits. Table 11 in the appendix provides the estimates. If a subject won the contest in the past month or
had won a contest in any previous month, the size of the deposit made in the next month grows. The former
grows the average deposit made by more than 8000 UGX, increasing the probability of making a deposit by
30%, while the latter increases the average deposit by approximately 3000 UGX increasing the probability
of making a deposit in the month by about 10%. Thus, the act of winning a contest creates inertia.

6.3

Heterogeneous Treatment Effect

The previous subsection established that the Save to Win accounts, buttressed with a minimum prize guarantee, can promote savings by those who otherwise would not be saving. We next ask who it is who responds
positively to the intervention. In this subsection, we will explore four dimensions to the background and
characteristics of the subject pool.
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First, we consider two important dimensions to preferences, namely risk aversion and patience. Hypotheses 3 and 4 predict they should be important for our intervention’s success. We had each subject complete
an incentivized price menu risk assessment. Similar to Eckel and Grossman (2002), subjects make a series
of binary choices between a 50-50 lottery and a certain amount. The lottery resulted in either 0 or 1000
UGX. The decision problems differ by the size of the certain amount (ranging from 50 to 1000 UGX). A
reproduction of the risk assessment is provided in Table 10 of the appendix.
We record a subject as being risk averse if the number of choices where s/he selected the certain outcome
is more than what a risk neutral decision maker would select.13 In our sample, 79.3% of our subjects who
completed the risk assessment are recorded as being risk averse.
In addition, in the background questionnaire a simple survey question asks subjects to rate on a one to
five Likert scale how patient of a person s/he views him/herself. The mean value is 3.95. In total, 34.2%
score themselves as a ‘5’ on the scale, while 36.8% report a ‘4’. This leaves 29.0% of the subjects viewing
themselves as having some degree of impatience. These two assessments allow us to evaluate two important
dimensions to savings behavior: risk and time preferences.
Third, we will compare those subjects with differing financial market activities. In our questionnaire, we
ask about experience with microfinance loans. This will potentially be important as the implementation of
Save to Win accounts by others will likely be done through already established microfinance institutions.
Overall, 44.1% of our subjects have received a microloan in the past.
Also, we compare those subjects who enjoy gambling to those who do not. Our Save to Win accounts
introduce uncertainty which may be enjoyed by those who enjoy gambling. We record a subject as being a
gambler if they report that they had placed a wager in the previous month; 5.6% of our subjects had.
6.3.1

Risk Preference

First, the Save to Win account’s design was done to take advantage of subject’s competitiveness and utility
received from engaging in lotteries. Of course, not every subject will prefer to have uncertainty interjected
into his/her savings decisions. As articulated in Hypothesis 3, risk averse individuals can be expected to be
less interested in participating in the Save to Win program.
Therefore, we use the risk assessment to identify those subjects who are risk averse. To first evaluate
differences in behavior of risk averse and non-risk averse subjects, we consider the ratio of average deposit
size (per month, per subject) for those who are identified as being risk averse, over the average deposit size
for those who are not identified as being risk averse. If this ratio is less than 1.0, then the risk averse subjects
deposit relatively less, which is what we anticipate will happen. Lower values to this ratio, though, denote
a stronger relative effect of risk aversion. Figure 6 presents this ratio for the those in the Control and those
13 In our assessment, ten of the twenty decision problems have the certain amount strictly greater than the expected value
of the lottery. The eleventh has the two equal. Hence, a risk averse subject will select the certain outcome at least ten times.
In addition, due to incomplete participation in the assessments, data on risk preferences exist for 111 subjects (76.6% of the
subject population). An indicator variable for missing information is created and included in the upcoming regression analysis.
Thus, the risk aversion metric should be interpreted as being conditioned on the completion of the assessment.
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in Treatment 4-1.

Ratio of Avg. Deposit of Risk Averse to Non-Risk Averse

Figure 6: Difference Between Risk Averse and Non-Risk Averse Subjects
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Each column depicts the average per subject deposit for those who are risk averse divided by the average per subject deposit
for those who are not risk averse (for that cohort). Thus, values less than one indicate that the risk averse make smaller
deposits than the non-risk averse.

For both cohorts, risk averse individuals deposit less than non-risk averse subjects. The difference is more
pronounced for those in Treatment 4-1, which includes the lottery. The risk averse only deposit approximately
55% as much as others within the same treatment. Thus, Figure 6 provides suggestive evidence that risk
preferences matter for the success of the Save to Win program.
To evaluate econometrically risk’s heterogeneous treatment effect, we extend the previous tables to include
the subjects’ risk preference metric. We include this characteristic as an explanatory variable for the deposit
sizes made by subjects in the treatments. We also interact it with the treatment indicators to evaluate
heterogeneous treatment effects. Table 4 provides the results.
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Table 4: Risk Preference & Deposit Size
Model:

OLS
(1)
-891.28
(1508.46)

Tobit
(2)
-1809.62
(4172.56)

Treatment 4-1, Guarantee

7847.22 ***
(2171.04)

17296.38 ***
(5981.10)

Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee

77.99
(1659.98)

5511.42
(4465.09)

Risk Averse x Treatment 4-1, Guarantee

-6697.80 ***
(2343.84)

-11955.63 *
(6357.52)

Risk Averse x Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee

-168.65
(1876.88)

-2299.26
(5140.14)

Background Controls
Treatment Month Controls

No
No

Yes
Yes

R2
AIC

0.042
18166

0.064
5421

Risk Averse

The dependent variable is the size of the subject’s deposit for a month (in Ugandan Shillings); µ = 2488.79 UGX. A constant
is included in each specification, but not reported. Also, the Treatment 3-2 indicator, along with its interaction with risk
aversion, are included as well. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level of significance.
N = 870 for (1) and N = 852 for (2). In (2), there are 622 left-censored observations and 230 uncensored observations.

Within the control group, the deposits of risk averse individuals are slightly smaller than the non-risk
averse. This difference, though, is not statistically significant. This is reasonable since those randomly
selected to be in the control group do not have the uncertainty created by the contest. Without this
uncertainty, the difference in behavior is not pronounced.
Regarding those individuals selected randomly to be in the treatment, a noticeable difference arises.
Relative to those in the control group (the omitted category), the non-risk averse increase their deposits
when the contests are included in the intervention. Once again, this effect is pronounced for those who
also have the minimum guaranteed amount on the prize. Using the coefficient estimate in column (1) of
7847.22, being in Treatment 4-1 with the guarantee for a non-risk averse subject results in almost a full
standard deviation increase in the amount deposited each month (0.94 standard deviations). For those in
this treatment, the risk averse subjects deposit significantly less than the non-risk averse subjects. Using the
estimated coefficient in column (1) of -6687.80 and the summary statistics for only those subjects assigned
to Treatment 4-1, the risk averse deposit more than two-thirds of a standard deviation less than the non-risk
averse subjects.14 Hence, risk preferences are an important consideration in the implementation of Save to
14 For
6697.80
9673.16

the sample of those randomly assigned to Treatment 4-1, the standard deviation to the deposits is 9673.16. Hence,
= 0.69.
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Win.
As before, column (2) adds the background control variables and treatment month fixed effects, and
estimates a Tobit model acknowledging the clumping of the data at zero. The results identified in column
(1) persist with these alterations.
The specifications presented in Table 4 include an indicator variable for being assigned to Treatment 3-2,
along with an interaction between it and a subject being risk averse. They are added to maintain subjects in
the control as the omitted, reference category. We do not present the results because, as already established,
behavior by those in this treatment are not statistically different from the control and the differentiation
between guaranteed and non-guaranteed prizes were not done.15 Also, while not presented here, the risk
averse are less likely to make a deposit and those within the treatment with the guarantee are less likely
to make a deposit than those who are not risk averse. These differences are small and, for the most part,
statistically insignificant. Thus, they are not presented separately here. The margin that adjusts is the size
of the deposit, as illustrated in Table 4.
6.3.2

Time Preference

A second dimension to individual’s traits is time preferences. Hypothesis 4 predicts that patient individuals
are more likely to save, and save more when a non-zero amount is chosen. Here, we use the survey question
asking subjects to rank, on a Likert scale, the degree to which they view themselves as a patient person.16
Table 5 explores the relationship between patience and savings.
Regarding those individuals selected randomly to be in the treatment, the more patient a subject is the
greater the monthly deposit becomes. For example, comparing a self-identified ‘somewhat patient’ person
to a ‘very patient person’ (i.e., comparing a “agree” to “strongly agree” response) is associated, using the
estimate in column (1), with a increase in deposits per month of 4149.24 UGX. Again, using the distribution
of deposits made by those assigned to Treatment 4-1, this corresponds to an increase of almost one-half of
a standard deviation (0.43 standard deviations). Thus, within the group selected to participate in the Save
to Win accounts, the effectiveness of the intervention in encouraging savings is stronger the more future
orientated the person is.
Interestingly, this effect also exists for those assigned to Treatment 4-1 without the guaranteed minimum prize. Here, comparing a ‘somewhat’ to ‘very’ patient subject, deposits per month are 0.22 standard
deviations greater. Thus, both Save to Win designs are effective for patient individuals.
As before, column (2) adds the background control variables and treatment month fixed effects, and
estimates a Tobit model acknowledging the censoring of the data at zero. For the most part, the results
identified in column (1) persist.
Again, while not presented, patient individuals in the treatment are more likely to make a deposit in a
15 The

results presented do not change when these subjects are instead omitted from the data set.
survey question simply states, “I consider myself a patient person.” and provides a five-point Likert scale ranging from
‘Strongly Disagree’ (=1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (=5).
16 The
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Table 5: Patience & Deposit Size
Model:

OLS
(1)
-3261.75 ***
(983.30)

Tobit
(2)
-6271.80 *
(3365.73)

Treatment 4-1, Guarantee

-14167.22 ***
(4557.23)

-23400.87
(16134.00)

Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee

-13240.55 ***
(-13240.55)

-21586.55
(18852.00)

Patient x Treatment 4-1, Guarantee

4139.24 ***
(1190.43)

8579.90 **
(4191.71)

Patient x Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee

2089.13 **
(1429.77)

6194.51
(4831.98)

Background Controls
Treatment Month Controls

No
No

Yes
Yes

R2
AIC

0.052
9656

0.063
3014

Patient

The dependent variable is the size of the subject’s deposit for a month (in Ugandan Shillings); µ = 2585.20 UGX (for those
observations without missing values). A constant is included in each specification, but not reported. Also, the Treatment
3-2 indicator, along with its interaction with patience, are included as well. Standard errors are presented in parentheses;
*** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level of significance. N = 870 for (1) and N = 852 for (2). In (2), there are 324 left-censored
observations and 126 uncensored observations.
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month than less patient individuals in the treatment. Hence, time preferences matter for both the intensive
and extensive margin of savings with our Save to Win intervention.
Putting together the results from these last two tables, predictable relationships between individual
preferences and savings behavior arises. The Save to Win program, which was shown to be effective on
average, is especially effective amongst those subjects who are not risk averse and who are patient. It may
not be a useful tool for risk averse and impatient individuals.
Result 3: The Save to Win intervention is more effective for those who are not risk averse and not impatient.
Thus, Hypotheses 3 and 4 receive empirical support.
6.3.3

Microfinance Experience

Along with considering a subject’s assessed preferences directly, we can also consider observable choices
in financial markets that can reasonably correlate with savings behavior. This is relevant for application.
Financial institutions promoting local development will be unlikely to directly measure preferences. Implementation through existing microfinance organizations is likely.
First, we explore the correlation between experience in financial markets and savings behavior. Our
subject pool is made primarily of those who for the most part do not use formal savings accounts. Many
have experience with financial markets through microcredit (more than 40%). We separate our subjects by
those who have received a microfinance loan in the past from those who have not. In Figure 7 we consider
the ratio of the average per month deposit of those who have received a microloan to those who have not,
similar to Figure 6’s analysis of risk preferences.
The relative size of the deposit amounts of those with microfinance experience are substantially higher
than those without the experience in the control group. Those who have received microloans in the past take
advantage of the high monthly interest rate provided in the baseline intervention. This difference reverses
for those subjects assigned to the Save to Win treatment. Those who have previously received microloans
do not participate. This suggests that individuals with experience in financial markets respond poorly to
the intervention, relative to those with less experience.
Next, we consider the econometric results controlling for differences in the subject population. Table 6
presents the results.
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Figure 7: Difference Between Those Who Have Received Microloans and Those Who Have Not
1.6

Ratio of Avg. Deposits

1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
T4-1

Control

Each column depicts the average per subject deposit for those who who have received a microfinance loan divided by the
average per subject deposit for those who have not. Thus, values less than one indicate that those who have received a
microloan make smaller deposits than those who have not received a microloan.

Table 6: Microfinance Experience & Deposit Size
Model:

OLS
(1)
997.79
(1227.80)

Tobit
(2)
-5658.47
(3784.03)

Treatment 4-1, Guarantee

3863.59 ***
(1007.60)

6992.64 **
(3020.64)

Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee

771.99
(1051.42)

3467.33
(3373.61)

Microfinance x Treatment 4-1, Guarantee

-5489.85 ***
(1731.05)

-4799.02
(5430.48)

Microfinance x Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee

-1653.81
(1610.60)

1897.79
(4890.53)

Background Controls
Treatment Month Controls
R2
AIC

No
No
0.037
18176

Yes
Yes
0.065
5419

Microfinance

The dependent variable is the size of the subject’s deposit for a month (in Ugandan Shillings); µ = 2488.79 UGX. A
constant is included in each specification, but not reported. Also, the Treatment 3-2 indicator, along with its interaction
with microfinance, are included as well. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level of
significance. N = 870 for (1) and N = 852 for (2). In (2), there are 622 left-censored observations and 230 uncensored
observations.
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Again, within those assigned to the control group, past microloan recipients behave (statistically) similar
to those without that experience. Within the treatment group, especially those with the guaranteed prize,
microfinance recipients make smaller deposits. Using the estimated coefficient in column (1), this corresponds
to 0.60 standard deviation decrease.
In column (2), though, the statistical significance of this effect is gone. Investigating this change further,
if (2) is re-estimated using OLS, the coefficient on Microfinance x Treatment 4-1, Guarantee remains statistically insignificant. Significance is regained if either the wealth-related controls (i.e., composition of the
floor and walls of a subject’s house and the availability of electricity) or the occupation-related indicators
(whether the subject owns livestock or farms crops) are excluded. Thus, microfinance experiences coincides
with economic well-being of the subjects. Relatively better off individuals tend to be the one’s who receive
microfinance loans in the past. It is this group that does not respond positively when the Save to Win
intervention is offered.
Once again, while not presented here, similar findings arise if the extensive margin to savings is considered
(rather, whether a deposit was made in a month). Taken together, those types of people who chose to seek
out microloans are also the ones who save and prefer not to participate in the Save to Win program. Our
intervention is effective for those without experience with financial markets.
6.3.4

Gambling

Finally, the Save to Win program introduces uncertainty into the savings decision by having contests. The
winner of the contest is driven by “luck”, akin to gambling. Further, related research suggests that sports
gambling can be a strategy used to provide the funds needed to acquire indivisible, lumpy expenditures
(Herskowitz, 2021). Therefore, we consider a subject’s self-reported interaction in gambling markets and use
of Save to Win in Table 7.
The increase in the average, per month deposit is concentrated in those who gamble leisurely. What
is noteworthy about the findings in Table 7 is that this heterogeneous effect occurs in the Treatment 4-1
cohort who did not have the guarantee. This suggests that “gamblers” prefer not to have the protection
of the minimum prize. They escalate their savings when risks exist. In the treatment with the guaranteed
minimum, it is the non-gamblers who respond by depositing relatively more.
Result 4: Savings behavior of those in the Save to Win intervention is correlated with microfinance experience and gambling participation.

7

Long-Term Effects

While we have documented an effect of our treatment, it is prudent to ask whether we have a long-term
impact. In this section, we evaluate two additional data. First, we track account balances over time after
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Table 7: Gambling Participation & Deposit Size
Model:

OLS
(1)
-2142.16
(3410.61)

Tobit
(2)
-7522.62
(12529.66)

Treatment 4-1, Guarantee

1964.61 **
(827.93)

6344.46 ***
(2465.41)

Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee

-472.44
(779.72)

1816.84
(2477.77)

Gambler x Treatment 4-1, Guarantee

-1464.61
(4825.48)

-9497.94
(17458.78)

Gambler x Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee

12639.11 ***
(4190.20)

29152.28 **
(13820.38)

Background Controls
Treatment Month Controls

No
No

Yes
Yes

R2
AIC

0.043
18165

0.065
5416

Gambler

The dependent variable is the size of the subject’s deposit for a month (in Ugandan Shillings); µ = 2488.79 UGX. A
constant is included in each specification, but not reported. Also, the Treatment 3-2 indicator, along with its interaction
with gambling, are included as well. Standard errors are presented in parentheses; *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% level of significance.
N = 870 for (1) and N = 852 for (2). In (2), there are 622 left-censored observations and 230 uncensored observations.
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our intervention ended. Second, we survey subjects one year after Phase 1 ended (six months after Phase 2
ended) to gain insight into their post-intervention behavior.

7.1

Wealth Accumulation

A concern is that the wealth accumulation documented is transitory. As stated, the intervention provided
both a higher monthly interest rate and a contest. After the six month intervention ended, all accounts
automatically rolled over into a 0% interest savings account, but without withdrawal constraints. It is quite
possible that a subject would rather not engage in the savings contest, prefers to not save when the interest
rate is zero, but is willing to save and even take on the contest’s uncertainty when the interest rate is 2%
per month. Such a person would be expected to participate but liquidate his or her holdings at the end of
the trial’s phase. Consumption could have simply been delayed. Alternatively, if the wealth accumulated
during the intervention promoted savings, and more importantly promoted saving behavior, then the account
balances will stay above zero.
Therefore, we track the subjects after the intervention. Figure 8 depicts the average savings account
balances of the Phase 1 subjects in each cohort. It includes data since the opening of the bank in the
community, through our intervention, and for the twelve months after Phase 1 of the Save to Win mechanism
ended. This means that we have twelve months of post-study balance information for those in Phase 1 and
six months for those in Phase 2. It also means that we have six months of pre-study information for those in
Phase 1 and twelve months for those in Phase 2. We do not include interest accumulation in these balances
so that we isolate saving choices.
During Phase 1, the balances of the subjects in all cohorts grow rapidly. Clearly, there is an initial jump
in the intervention’s first month, which is to be expected given that a deposit must be made to be eligible
to be a part of our intervention. Recall that if a subject came to the advertised meeting to be a part of
the study, they received an account with a starting balance of 2500 UGX, which is the minimum account
balance allowed by the bank. The per subject balance, though, is substantially higher than this minimum.
For example, the per subject account balance for those in the control is 14.4 times as great after the first
month of our intervention than the month prior. If subjects had only taken the opening account balances as
charity, the per subject balance would have only increased by a factor of 6.2.
Balances grow for subjects in all three cohorts over the intervention’s time period, as established previously. Interestingly and importantly, the balances after the intervention do not zero out. As one can see
in Figure 8, the balances of those in Treatment 3-2 and the control stay relatively stable afterwards. Over
time they begin to grow. Those assigned to Treatment 4-1 experience an escalated post-intervention growth.
There are periods of partial liquidation. A subset of this subject pool starts actively using their savings
account building up their balances substantially. These observations suggest that the intervention promoted
savings behavior.
To evaluate post-intervention behavior in Phase 2, we recenter the data around the timing of the treatment
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Figure 8: Account Balances for Phase 1 Participants
Account Balance
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Open circles denote the average account balance of those within the Control group. Closed circles denote the average
account balance of those within the Treatment 4-1 group. The triangles denote the average account balance of those within
the Treatment 3-2 group. The y-axis measures the average (per subject) account balance for those within each cohort each
month.
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so that T ime = 0 is the first month of the intervention for both phases and the post intervention behavior
is measured for T ime ≥ 6. Rather, we extend Figure 4. Data from subjects in the two controls are pooled.
Figure 9 presents the average account balances for subjects in both phases.
Figure 9: Account Balances Centered on the Treatment
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Data is centered on the beginning of the treatment. Open circles denote the average account balance of those within the
Control group. Closed circles denote the average account balance of those within the Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee group.
The squares denote the average account balance of those within the Treatment 4-1, Guarantee group. The triangles denote
the average account balance of those within the Treatment 3-2 group. The y-axis measures the average (per subject)
account balance for those within each cohort each month.

Recall that since Phase 2 started at the conclusion of Phase 1, subjects in this phase had a twelve months
to open savings accounts and save prior. Few in these cohorts did so. Therefore, it is fair to presume
that Phase 2 considers individuals who would not be interacting in formal financial markets absent our
intervention.
Once again, the treated subjects build up their savings both during and after the intervention (depicted
by the “T4-1+G” line). Again, immediate liquidation after the conclusion of the mechanism does not occur.
Balances continuously grow for those in Treatment 4-1 with the guarantee.
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To confirm econometrically, we consider the pooled data set of account balances of the subjects from
T ime = −12 to T ime = 1717 and evaluate the time trend in wealth accumulation. We allow jumps in the
time trend at the beginning and end of the intervention, and allow for the trend to adjust after each. Rather,
we estimate
Balanceit = α0 + α1 Studyit + α2 P ostit + α3 T imeit + α4 T imeit × Studyit + α5 T imeit × P ostit + it . (4)
The indicator Study equals one for the months where the Save to Win accounts are active and the indicator
Post equals one for the periods after. That is, Study = 1 for T ime ∈ [0, 5] and P ost = 1 for T ime ∈ [6, 17].
This equation is estimated for each treatment cohort. Immediate liquidation would result in α2 < 0. Instead,
if we promoted continued savings behavior after our intervention, then α5 > 0. Table 8 presents the results.
Table 8: Time Series
Treatment
Treatment
4-1, Guarantee 4-1, No Guarantee
447.74
756.15
(416.42)
(3270.07)

Treatment
3-2
928.57
(1264.27)

102.94
(446.03)

Time x Study

3409.75 ***
(1260.43)

357.28
(4624.57)

-662.23
(1787.95)

1843.59 *
(1000.20)

Time x Post

2149.41 *
(1260.43)

40.37
(3464.39)

513.56
(1339.40)

10142.36 **
(4687.39)

constant

5045.27
(3063.14)

4925.58
(12735.08)

5892.16
(4923.62)

1041.98
(2542.77)

Study

12884.74 ***
(4728.42)

10388.93
(16130.86)

5134.49
(6236.49)

8567.41 **
(3716.50)

Post

197.70
(10760.05)

15034.60
(3464.39)

-4298.32
(7241.67)

10142.36 **
(4687.39)

R2
N

0.179
792

0.016
1032

0.054
816

0.089
840

Time

Control

Dependent variable is the ending account balance for a subject for the month. Each column presents the results for the
subsample defined. Standard errors presented in parentheses; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% level of significance.

Notice that the coefficient on T ime × P ost, α
b5 , is positive and statistically significant for Treatment
4-1 with the guaranteed prize. Thus, not only did this treatment produce the most savings during the
intervention (as acknowledged by the positive and statistically significant coefficients on the intervention
indicator and its interaction with time), but it improved the average savings rate over time. We interpret
this as savings behavior being promoted.
The effect is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero for that treatment without the guarantee.
Instead, those subjects experience a large (but statistically insignificant) level increase after the intervention’s
17 T ime

runs to a value of 17 since the study’s intervention occurs for periods 0 through 5 of the re-centered data and the
twelve months of post-intervention behavior occurs from period 6 to 17.
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end. Again, the results for those in Treatment 3-2 point to its ineffectiveness. The high interest rate provided
to those in the control promotes both savings during, and sustained savings after.
The final dimension to our post-intervention analysis is the question of whose savings behavior changed.
Our presumption is that the inducement to save during the intervention encouraged a subset of the subjects
to continue to save afterwards. An alternative is that the uncertainty discouraged potential savers. After our
intervention ended, this group begins to save. To evaluate this, we differentiate our subjects by the number
of months they participated by making a deposit. Some subjects were active only in the first month and
did not return to the bank and make a deposit in any of the remaining five months. Moderate participants
come back one more month. We classify the users of the program as those who make additional deposits
in at least two more months, thus participating in contests at least one-half of the time. Table 9 compares
their average account balances at the end of the intervention to their balances six months after.18
Table 9: Account Balance Growth
Number of months
with a deposit after
the initial month
0
1
2 or more

Avg. balance
at the end of
the intervention
7573.47
21,609.09
83,940.38

Avg. balance
six months after
the intervention
7231.63
31,836.36
127,713.50

% change

N

-4.5%
+47.3%
+52.1%

98
22
26

Subjects are classified by the number of months, after the first month of the intervention (when everyone must make a
deposit), where at least one deposit is made.

First, as to be expected, those who made deposits in two or more months after the initial month have
higher average balances.19 There is a monotonic relationship between the number of months participating in
the intervention and the growth rate of the accounts. In fact, those who did not participate see a reduction
in their balance. These subjects presumably gained from the community meal and the opening account
balance, but did not want to save. For those who frequently participated, they continued to grow and in
fact escalated their average monthly deposits. This is especially noteworthy remembering that after the
intervention, accounts did not pay any interest.
Result 5: The Save to Win intervention has a longer-term improvement in wealth.
Overall, our Save to Win intervention had a meaningful impact on savings in the community even after our
intervention ended.
It is worth noting here the strong heterogeneous behaviors both during the experiment and after. Approximately two-thirds of the subjects did not participate in our mechanism after enrolling in the first month.
Enrolling provided them with the 2500 UGX gift (and its compounded interest), but exposed them to the
18 We

choose six months because we have data on account balances for participants in both phases through six months.
account balance information provided does not include interest accumulation, but does include the prizes that were
won in the contests.
19 The
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losses from not winning the contest in that first month. After the intervention ended, they only withdrew
a small proportion of their balance. The one-third who did participate built up substantial savings and
continued to make deposits after the intervention.

7.2

Survey Responses

In December 2019 Embrace It Africa engaged in a survey of those who had participated in our Save to Win
program. They asked questions about the growing use of mobile money accounts, participation in ROSCAs,
and use of other SACCOs. We added a few questions to their short survey.20 Specifically, we wanted to
assess (i) what our intervention crowded out and (ii) what are their future plans with the account balances.
Survey data is notoriously unreliable. Subjects may not respond truthfully, instead providing answers
that they feel the survey taker wants to hear. In addition, respondents may not be aware of their actual
behavior at the margin. Nevertheless, we felt that the responses, while potentially imprecise, could be
informative in providing a glimpse of our intervention’s impact.
We feel that this is important in our context. We intervened in a poverty stricken community where
income and wealth are insufficient. Educational attainment is low and health is poor. Rakai was the center
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the 1980s and 1990s with high prevalence to this day. One concern is that
saving at Mikwano requires that money to be taken away from another valued use. For another, we are
introducing uncertainty into a world full of uncertainties with little formal or informal insurance.
The survey team was able to connect with 128 of our subjects (88%). The month of the survey corresponds
to twelve months since the completion of Phase 1 and six months since the end of Phase 2. To address (i),
we asked them “If you had not deposited money into the Save to Win account, which of the following would
you have done with the money?” and asked them to select one of multiple choices. Increased savings at
the bank must come from funds that would have been used for another purpose. Hence, it is important to
understand the side effects (Medina, 2021). Figure 10 depicts the results.
20 We

also covered the labor costs of the survey.
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Figure 10: What would you have done with the money you deposited?
save at home

52%

17%
32%
another bank
bought something

A slight majority would have saved the money at home. Thus, for these subjects, Mikwano was able to
provide a safe place to save and our intervention encouraged it. Given that our subjects do not liquidate after
the intervention, this risk mitigation seems to be a big part of our intervention’s value. Also, about one-third
of the subjects report forgone consumption.21 Interestingly, for one-sixth of our subjects, we substituted
away from using another bank. Since members of the Bethlehem community must travel a distance (without
paved roads) to the nearest city to find another bank, our intervention presumably lowered the transaction
cost to saving for these subjects.
We also asked our subjects in a multiple choice question what they plan to do with their balances in the
future. Figure 11 depicts their responses.
21 These

responses were split between buying something for one’s self and buying something for friends and family.

39

Figure 11: What will you do with your account balance?

spend some but keep open

31%

60%
increase it

10%
spend it and close

Three-fifths of the respondents plan to further increase their balances, and only 10% plan to close their
accounts. Given that approximately 88% did not have accounts prior to our intervention, we clearly brought
financial inclusion to the community.
Finally, to gauge satisfaction with the Save to Win program, we asked simple evaluative questions. First,
we asked subjects whether they would like to participate in the future if Mikwano was to offer the accounts.
Figure 12 depicts their responses.
Figure 12: Would you like to participate in Save to Win in the Future?
No
12%

Not Sure
20%

68%

Yes

Only 12% report that they would not. Therefore, we believe that for the vast majority of the community,
our intervention was utility enhancing. Less encouraging, though, is the results from our follow up question
asking which treatment they would have preferred to be in. Just over 70% of the subjects who said they would
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be willing to participate in the future report a preference for the control (accounts without the contest). No
subject prefers the Treatment 3-2, which coincides with the lack of enthusiasm in our previously reported
depositing behavior.
Digging further into these responses, interestingly, 75% of the subjects selected randomly to be in Treatment 3-2 report a preference for having been in the control. On the other hand, 70% of those chosen to be in
the control would have preferred to have the contest included. The grass seems greener on the other side of
the fence. Of those who were selected randomly to be in Treatment 4-1, a noticeable difference in responses
arises between those who had the guaranteed minimum prize and those who did not. The proportion who
prefer to continue with the contest is 75% higher for those who had the guarantee than those who did not.
Taken together, this suggests that it is important to design the Save to Win accounts properly. Treatment
3-2 did not inspire savings behavior and generated a dis-satisfaction with the contest linked savings. The
guaranteed minimum prize promoted an interest in including the contest, while those who did not have the
opportunity to participate wish they could have.
The divided opinions regarding the Save to Win program did not spill over and diminish participants’
views on Mikwano. Figure 13 depicts their assessment of our partner organization.
Figure 13: Future savings at Mikwano?

save more
88%
7%
save less
5%
no change

The community was motivated by the savings product and respond eagerly to opportunities at the
microfinance bank we partnered with.

8

Conclusion

We develop an innovative mechanism to promote saving in a poverty stricken area of the world. Our insight
builds upon the findings in behavioral and experimental economics on contests, which consistently documents
an excessive amount of competition in these environments. We link contests to savings in our Save to Win
41

accounts and randomize assignment to them varying the allocation of deposits and the determination of
the prize’s size. Our intuition is that the motivations that drive excessive competition in contests can be
harnessed to promote savings.
Overall, we document an important increase in savings due to our intervention. In all cohorts, savings
far exceeds that observed prior to the intervention and by those not currently in our treatments. Second,
our control group benefits from the opening balance and high interest rate, but does not get to participate
in the savings contest. Those in our treatments also have a portion of their deposits put into a contest. We
show that our Save to Win account promotes saving, especially those treated with a guaranteed minimum
prize. Third, we establish important and intuitive heterogeneous treatment effects. The introduction of
contests promote savings of those who are not risk averse and who are patient. It is not used by those who
have recently received microloans and are enjoyed by those who like to gamble. Fourth, we show that our
intervention has long lasting effects on savings behavior as average balances actually grow over time.
Our objective was to implement a novel savings mechanism in the field, which was informed by research in
behavioral and experimental economics, that can easily be implemented by existing microfinance institutions
at a relatively low cost. We are constrained in both sample size and number of treatments by the population
size of the community we worked with. Nevertheless, our positive results point the way to a potential valuable
intervention for organizations striving to mitigate poverty.
Caution is prudent. Along with concerns about Save to Win’s external validity in different communities
with contrasting economic, social, legal, and cultural environments, the normative implications are unclear.
Undeniably, our intervention built up savings account balances. What is uncertain is what was the opportunity cost of doing so. Given our savings results, we crowded out other forms of savings; especially informal,
at-home saving. Thus, our benefit to most may have been mitigation of risk and lowered transaction cost
to saving. Some report reduced consumption as well. It is unclear what disutilities were experienced so
that subjects could engage in our intervention. Our sincere hope is that subjects expect more benefit from
this savings than the costs incurred, and that negative spillovers were minimal. A second note of caution
is that our treatment effect requires that not too much is put into the contest and that a minimum prize is
ensured. Thus, the value of Save to Win accounts is sensitive to its design. Third, our results indicate that
a zero-sum mechanism is relatively ineffective. While potentially desirable, as practitioners can implement
it at little cost, to generate the competitiveness of contests an external subsidy is needed. Therefore, the
savings contest may need to be coupled within an institution making microloans where the capital raised
can generate the needed returns. If our mechanism was to be rolled out and scaled up, further evaluation of
the best design parameters and a fuller understanding of the tradeoffs present is necessary and appropriate.
Much work still needs to be done. First, given that our most aggressive mechanism did not succeed,
future work should search to identify the optimal balance between entries into the contest and proportion
saved to find the optimal ratio. Second, like Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin’s (2006) work on time preferences, it
may be important to first identify those who are risk averse and offer them an alternative. It may be best,
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for example, to let subjects choose their treatment as well. Finally, for the guaranteed minimum prize we
picked one level. It was selected to be greater than what typically arose in the contests. We show that this
guarantee was, in fact, crucial for the intervention’s success. It requires external subsidization. How large
of a prize to ensure is unexplored. What the treatment effect is for different size prizes would be useful
knowledge for a nonprofit organization who must balance costs with social benefits.
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10.1

Appendix
Proofs

Proof of Hypothesis 1
For the interior solution (where se > 0), complementary slackness requires that
Π = Πz , it follows that E(s; τ ) = (1 − τ )s. Hence, from (3),
∂J
∂u
∂u
−
+δ
(1 + i) = 0.
∂s
∂c1
∂c2
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem,

 2 
∂2J
∂ J
de
s
+ dτ
= 0.
2
∂s
∂s∂τ


Since it was assumed that

∂2J
∂s2

< 0, it follows that if Assumption 1 holds, then
2

∂ J
de
s
= − ∂s∂τ
< 0.
∂2J
dτ
∂s2
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∂L
∂s

= 0. Further, when

This verifies [2] and [3]. For the extensive margin, where se = 0, complementary slackness requires that
∂L
∂s

≤ 0. When se = 0, it follows that E(s; τ ) = 0. Since u(c) is strictly increasing (so that the budget

constraints bind), se = 0 requires that
∂J
∂u
∂u
−
+δ
(1 + i) ≤ 0.
∂s
∂c1
∂c2
When this inequality holds, the individual chooses not to save. It follows immediately from Assumption 1
that an increase in τ expands the set of economic environments where savings is zero. This verifies [1].
QED
Proof of Hypothesis 2
∂L
∂s

Consider an interior solution where se > 0. Complementary slackness requires that

= 0. When

g

Π = Π , it follows that

E(s; τ ) =

(1 − τ )s
(1 − τ )s + σ



Πg ,

where σ is the amount put into the contest by the other contestants. As a consequence,


(1 − τ )σ
∂E
=
Πg .
∂s
[(1 − τ )s + σ]2
Hence,
∂2E
=
∂s2



−2(1 − τ )2 σ
[(1 − τ )s + σ]3



Πg < 0,

and
∂2E
=
∂s∂τ



(1 − τ )σs − σ 2
[(1 − τ )s + σ]3



Πg .

Turning to the optimal savings decision by the individual, in an interior solution
∂L
∂c2

∂u
= δ ∂c
− λ2 = 0. Hence,
2

∂L
∂s

∂L
∂c1

=

∂u
∂c1

− λ1 = 0 and

= 0 is now


∂J
∂u
∂u
∂E
−
= 0.
+δ
(1 + i) τ +
∂s
∂c1
∂c2
∂s

Applying the Implicit Function Theorem,
 2

 2


∂ J
∂u
∂2E
∂ J
∂u
∂2E
de
s
+
δ
(1
+
i)
+
dτ
+
δ
(1
+
i)
1
+
=0
∂s2
∂c2
∂s2
∂s∂τ
∂c2
∂s∂τ
Comparing this to the comparative static prediction with the no-guarantee, zero-sum prize,
2

∂ J
+ Nτ
de
s
= − ∂s∂τ
,
∂2J
dτ
∂s2 + Ns

where Ns and Nτ are the new terms introduced in the two brackets. Since

∂2E
∂s2

< 0 and

∂u
∂c2

> 0, it follows

that Ns < 0. As a consequence, the denominator continues to be negative. Further, since 1 +
∂u
∂c2

> 0, it follows that Nτ > 0. Consequently, if
Consequently, under Assumption 2,

Assumption 2 implies that

de
s
dτ

de
s
dτ

2

∂ J
∂s∂τ

∂2E
∂s∂τ

> 0 and

< −Nτ , then the numerator is negative as well.

< 0 for Π = Πg . Further, since the denominator is negative,

is smaller for the contest with Π = Πz than under the contest with Π = Πg .
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Therefore, compared to the control, for each of our treatments (τH and τL ) saving is greater in the contest
Π = Πg , which establishes [2].
For the extensive margin, where se = 0, complementary slackness requires that

∂L
∂s

≤ 0. When se = 0, it

follows that E(s; τ ) = 0. Since u(c) is strictly increasing (so that the budget constraint binds), se = 0 requires
that
∂J
∂u
∂u
−
+δ
(1 + i) ≤ 0.
∂s
∂c1
∂c2
When this inequality holds, the individual chooses not to save. It follows immediately from Assumption 2
that an increase in τ expands the set of economic environments where savings is zero more for contests with
Π = Πz than Π = Πg . This verifies [1].
QED
Proof of Hypothesis 3
Consider an interior solution, se > 0. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (3),



 2

∂u
∂u
∂ J
∂2E
∂E
+δ
= 0.
de
s
(1 + i) 2 + dδ
(1 + i) τ +
∂s2
∂c2
∂s
∂c2
∂s
It follows that

∂u
(1 + i) τ +
de
s
= − ∂c2 ∂ 2 J
dδ
∂s2 + Ns

∂E
∂s



As argued previously, the denominator is negative, regardless of whether the contest has a guaranteed
minimum prize or a no-guaranteed prize. Further, since
is positive. Hence,

de
s
dδ

∂u
∂c2

and

∂E
∂s

are both positive, then the numerator

> 0. This verifies [2].

For the extensive margin, where se = 0, complementary slackness requires that

∂L
∂s

≤ 0. When se = 0, it

follows that E(s; τ ) = 0. Since u(c) is strictly increasing (so that the budget constraint binds), se = 0 requires
that
∂J
∂u
∂u
−
+δ
(1 + i) ≤ 0.
∂s
∂c1
∂c2
When this inequality holds, the individual chooses not to save. It follows immediately that since

∂u
∂c2

> 0 an

increase in δ contracts the set of economic environments where savings is zero. This verifies [1].
QED
Proof of Hypothesis 4
Consider an interior solution, se > 0. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (3),
 2

 2


∂ J
∂u
∂2E
∂ J
∂2u
∂2u
∂E
de
s
+δ
(1 + i) 2 + dθ
−
+δ
(1 + i) τ +
= 0.
∂s2
∂c2
∂s
∂s∂θ ∂s∂θ
∂c2 ∂θ
∂s
It follows that

2

∂ J
+ Nθ
de
s
= − ∂s∂θ
2J
∂
dθ
∂s2 + Ns
2

2

∂ u
u
where Nθ = − ∂s∂θ
+ δ ∂c∂2 ∂θ
(1 + i) τ +

∂E
∂s



. As argued previously, the denominator is negative, regardless

of whether the contest has a guaranteed minimum prize or a no-guaranteed prize. Further, so long as
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∂2u
∂c1 ∂θ

2

u
≈ δ ∂c∂2 ∂θ
and −1 + (1 + i) τ +

negative so that

de
s
dθ

∂E
∂s



> 0, then Nθ < 0. Hence, from Assumption 3, the numerator is

< 0. This verifies [2].

For the extensive margin, where se = 0, complementary slackness requires that

∂L
∂s

≤ 0. When se = 0, it

follows that E(s; τ ) = 0. Since u(c) is strictly increasing (so that the budget constraint binds), se = 0 requires
that
∂J
∂u
∂u
−
+δ
(1 + i) ≤ 0.
∂s
∂c1
∂c2
When this inequality holds, the individual chooses not to save. It follows immediately that so long as
∂2u
∂c1 ∂θ

2

u
≈ δ ∂c∂2 ∂θ
an increase in θ expands the set of economic environments where savings is zero with

Assumption 3 holding. This verifies [1].
QED

10.2

Risk Assessment Survey

Table 10 presents a reproduction of the risk assessment used.
Table 10: Risk Assessment
Decision
number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

10.3

Option A
(certain amount)
1000
950
900
850
800
750
700
650
600
550
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50

Option B
(50-50 lottery)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)
(1000,0)

Additional Outlier Test

The following figures provide the average monthly deposits (averaging over the six months of the intervention)
for each subject in the Control and the two Treatment 4-1 cohorts. The subjects are ordered in increasing
values. As one can see, subject 36 in the control has a behavior far different than any other subject.
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Avg. Deposit per Month (in UGX)

Figure 14: Average Monthly Deposit for Control Subjects
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Avg. Deposit per Subject-Month

Figure 15: Average Monthly Deposit for Treatment 4-1, Guarantee Subjects
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Figure 17 re-estimates the main specification (column 2 of Table 2) systematically dropping one subject
from the control cohort. The coefficient on the treatment variable is depicted, and ordered in increasing
value. The 95% confidence intervals are depicted as well. Every confidence interval does not include 0 and,
hence, the main result is not sensitive to the exclusion of any other subject.
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Avg. Deposit per Subject-Month

Figure 16: Average Monthly Deposit for Treatment 4-1, No Guarantee Subjects
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Figure 17: Treatment Effect Dropping One Subject
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Each circle provides the estimated coefficient on Treatment 4-1, Guarantee from column 2 of Table 2, but dropping one
subject from the Control. The estimates are ordered from the lowest estimated coefficient to the greatest. The vertical bars
depict the 95% confidence intervals. The solid line is the estimated coefficient without dropping any other subjects (the
one presented in column 2 of Table 2). The dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval.
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10.4

Effect of Past Victories on Account Activity

The following table identifies how victories in previous months influence deposits.
Table 11: Effect of Past Victories
Dep. Var.= Deposit
Won Last Month

(1)
8795.51 **
(1710.56)

(2)
8280.31 ***
(1712.86)

Won In the Past

(3)

(4)

3624.18 ***
(993.71)

2960.32 ***
(1026.92)

Treatment Indicators Included?

No

Yes

No

Yes

R2
AIC
Dep. Var.= Active
Won Last Month

0.030
18165
(1)
0.3174 ***
(0.0919)

0.047
18156
(2)
0.2965 ***
(0.0924)

0.015
18178
(3)

0.030
18171
(4)

0.1261 **
(0.0158)

0.0990 *
(0.0552)

Won In the Past

Treatment Indicators Included?

No

Yes

No

Yes

R2
AIC

0.014
1058

0.022
1056

0.006
1064

0.014
1063

The variable Won Last Month equals one if the subject won a prize in the previous month. The variable Won In the Past
is equal to one if the subject won a prize in any previous month. Columns (1) and (3) only include the indicator variable
and a constant in a linear regression. Columns (2) and (4) also include the three treatment variables (with the control as
the omitted, reference group).

53

